Smart grids are an integrated solution to recently raised issues in the power industry. To achieve the main objectives of a smart grid, Energy Management System (EMS) must organically connect numerous SCADA systems included in existing power control systems. As such, it is necessary to establish vulnerability classification criteria for cyber security in the large-scale, multi-functional complex architecture of EMS. This paper presents a methodology for classifying cyber threats that can be applied to EMS models in a smart grid environment, and a qualitative analysis of the interactions between each level.
Introduction
In response to the recent demand for the modernization of power grids, there have been various discussions regarding the load maps of smart grids. Furthermore, there are ongoing efforts to reform power infrastructure.
facing the power industry. This concept can be divided into several main elements, viz. power system efficiency, accessibility of information, demand management, reliability of service, renewable energy usage, etc. Because smart grid concepts are of a combined nature, there have been various attempts at modeling smart grids [3] , [5] . In the smart grid environment, the characteristics of power control systems can be summarized as extendible, open, and accessible. Because these characteristics make such systems more vulnerable, however, it is important to understand the nature of cyber threats in order to ensure that such they are secure. Moreover, the importance of Energy Management System (EMS) when implementing smart grids is emphasized. Because EMS has a multi-functional, complex architecture with the increasing size of such systems, clear criteria are needed for classifying so-called cyber vulnerability.
In this paper, we examine the classification of cyber threats in the field of Information and Communication Technology (ICT). We establish criteria for classifying cyber vulnerability, such that they are consistent with the characteristics of EMS. Then, we classify cyber threats in accordance with these criteria. Finally, we present a qualitative analysis of the relationship between the cyber threats and each level.
categorized into system-, network-and web-level threats. As a prerequisite to cyber attacks, particular information regarding the target system must be acquired during a so-called information-seeking stage [6] .
System-level attacks
System-level attacks are attacks that attempt to hack into a single computer system. Such attacks aim to procure administrator privileges, or to operate the computer system in an abnormal manner.
Network-level attacks
Network-level attacks are performed by manipulating the consumption of available resources in a network. When these attacks occur, network services are disrupted, or the data transferred between the user and the network server is diverted, fabricated, or altered.
Web-level attacks
Web-level attacks are motivated by the appropriation of personal information or cyber-money, by political intentions, or by the malicious desires of individuals. Because these attacks target an unspecified multitude of users through a web server, they are most likely to impact the general public.
Information-seeking stage
Information seeking is the process whereby the attacker identifies the vulnerable aspects by collecting information regarding the target. This stage comprises three sub-stages: foot printing, scanning, and enumeration.
Based on the explanation above, the following table summarizes the general classification of cyber threats in ICT. 
Overview of Energy Management System
EMSs perform complex management functions such as real-time monitoring and load prediction through the analysis and processing of power data. Therefore, the role of EMS can be defined as the organic linking of every aspect, including the network, automation, software, and databases [7] .
The main objective of EMS is to deliver an optimal quantity of power with guaranteed economic viability to consumers.
The architectural characteristic of EMS comprises five different frameworks in a multifunctional architecture, wherein various applications ranging from power-generation planning to system analysis operate organically.
A schematic summary of the architectural characteristics of EMS is shown in Fig. 1 [8] . Fig. 1 . EMS framework.
Generation operation management
Generation operation management should include the following: Load forecasting (LF) Unit commitment (UC) Hydrothermal coordination (HTC) Real-time economic dispatch and reserve monitoring (ED) Real-time automatic generation control (AGC)
Transmission operations management
Transmission operation management should include the following: Network configuration/topology processor (TP) State estimation (SE) Contingency analysis (CA) Optimal power flow and security constrained optimal power flow (OPF, SCOPF) Islanding of power systems
Study mode simulations
Study mode simulations should include the following: Power flow (PF) Short-circuit analysis (SC) Network modeling
Energy services and event analysis
Energy services and event analysis should include the following: Event analysis Energy scheduling and accounting Energy service providers
Dispatcher training simulator
A dispatcher training simulator (DTS) provides a training environment to the administrator for realtime contingency management. This involves running an application to model the generator, prime movers, and the controllers of the actual system.
Classification of Vulnerability and Cyber-Attacks Specific to EMS
In this section, we propose the criteria for the classifying the vulnerability of EMS to cyber threats,
owing to the characteristics of EMS.
Vulnerability classification criteria for cyber security in EMS
Whereas the functionality of EMS is highly complicated, they ultimately consist of a communication network between independent single units, such as computers and other units.
Moreover, one of the important objectives of a smart grid is the bidirectional communication between the provider and the consumer. Therefore, the web and the system must be connected at a web access point, and it must be possible to announce and utilize the various information regarding power at these points.
Therefore, the classification criteria for the cyber vulnerability of EMS must consider the system, network, and web. In this section, these are referred to respectively as the component, communication, and web access point, out of consideration for the unique characteristics of power systems. 
Component
Components are the single units encompassing the independent small-scale systems that perform the necessary functions of a power system. For example, this includes the main computer responsible for the general management of all information from the master station (i.e., EMS), or the intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) that collect the power information from the field.
Communication
Communication refers to the communication between single units, or in other words, the exchange of information between components. Major examples of communication include the I nformation exchanged between the circuit breaker of the transmission line or the controller responsible for switchgear in the substation and the master station of the EMS, and the information exchanged between the IED that collects the power information from the consumer in real-time and the local distribution station.
Web access point
Web access points refer to the access points between the applications that are necessary for the consumer in a smart grid environment in order to obtain the information regarding the power system in real-time. For example, once the participants of the power market apply to a price tender through the web access point, the independent system operator (ISO) synchronizes the supply and demand at the tendered price. In this manner, the ISO establishes the system operation plan, and minimizes the overall system cost under the constraints [9] .
Classification of cyber-attacks based on vulnerability

Cyber-attacks on components
At the component level, the main objective of cyber-attacks is to acquire access permissions to the system. Attacks that can impact components include password attacks, buffer overflow attacks, malicious code, and denial of service (DoS) attacks. In this case, all attacks involve obtaining the access permissions in order to subsequently destroy the system through malicious code and steal information.
Cyber-attacks on communication
At the communication level, the system is extended through the communication channels connected between various components. Unlike component-level attacks, attacks at the communication level are restricted to the network resources.
The exchange of information comprises a series of steps, such as data processing and identification, along with data transfer. The list of applicable types of cyber-attacks here include sniffing attacks, spoofing attacks, session hijacking attacks, and man in the middle attacks.
Cyber-attacks on web access points
At the web access point, the components are connected to the web, allowing the users to obtain direct access to the power system. The applicable attacks in this case are restricted to the web, among network resources that are relevant in the case of communication-level attacks. For example, such attacks include common gateway interface attacks, attacks using authentication and cookies, and phishing attacks. However, the web is the most generally accessible network service in the world. Because numerous users share information and receive services through the web, this is the most problematic aspect of a smart grid framework from the perspective of cyber security.
The classification of cyber-attacks based on the proposed classification criteria for the constituent elements of a power information control system are shown in Table 2 . Table 2 . Classification of cyber-attacks in Smart Grid information collected from field devices at the RTU and the transfer of such information to the master station. Likewise, this is also applicable to the process of delivering the control commands from the control center to various components. Cyber-attacks on network resources distort the function of the SCADA system in power systems, through diversion, fabrication, and alteration of power information.
Finally, attacks on web access points can be examined in terms of their influence on the power market. In particular, problems during the settlement of charges can be expected, owing to the inconsistency in market information between the participants of the power market [10] . Fig. 3 . Qualitative analysis of the interactions between each level of the EMS.
Conclusion
Following the recent introduction of IEDs, which can serve as the eyes and ears of EMS, the number of web access points is expected to increase geometrically. Through access points, attackers can deliberately isolate the consumer from the real-time status of the power system, or these attackers can obtain direct access to the internal system of the power grid from a remote location.
In conclusion, there will be inevitable situations in smart grids where the natural connections between components and web access points will lead to more devastating results.
In this paper, we examined the relevant cyber attacks based on the classification of cyber attacks in ICT, and the classification criteria proposed in consideration of the unique characteristics of EMS. Moreover, we derived a more meaningful causality by presenting a qualitative classification of the interactions between each level.
It is widely believed that if a quantification methodology is developed based on the qualitative classification of cyber threats in future research, threats and the extent of damage can be predicted more accurately.
